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Abstract 
One of the distinctive features of contemporary organisations is their interconnect-
edness. Relationships between companies are usually analysed on the basis of 
social network relationships between them. The research question this article aims 
to answer concerns the influence of being part of an interorganisational network 
on the occurrence and consequences of unethical behaviour.  
This paper covers three main areas of research regarding this topic. Firstly, 
the role networks play in the initiation, evolution, and consequences of wrongdo-
ings. The main problem taken into consideration in this part of the article is identi-
fying network factors which increase and mitigate the propensity of organisations 
to deceive their partners. Two main types of such determinants include relational 
and structural factors. The first group usually involves features such as the 
strength of ties, the symmetry/asymmetry of ties, and the status of partners. The 
latter includes such variables as structural holes, centrality, density and the cohe-
siveness of the network. The second area covered in this article concerns how 
misconduct behaviours spread throughout the network of interorganisational ties. 
This phenomenon might resemble a social or emotional contagion occurring in 
social networks. The effects of unethical acts on the network are the main interest 
of the third part of this paper. Usually, the consequences of wrongdoing by one of 
the interconnected partners include a change in the quality of the related partners, 
modifications in the structure of the network, and an alteration of its prominence 
and cohesion. In conclusion, there are some suggestions for lines of inquiry in the 
area of unethical behaviour from the social network perspective in the future. 
Keywords:  unethical behaviours, network, interorganisational relationships, 
social networks 
JEL Classification: M10, M14, Z13 
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1. Introduction 
Contemporary organisations function in a very complex and uncertain environ-
ment. Globalization, technical progress, and steadily increasing market competi-
tion require creating new forms of cooperation based on interconnectedness. Net-
works of organisations operate in a different way from that of a single organisa-
tion and that specificity influences also the ethical sphere of their behaviours.1 The 
aim of this paper is to outline a theoretical framework and suggest some implica-
tions for future research concerning the initiation, spread and consequences of 
unethical behaviours from a social network perspective. Review and critical exam-
ination of the related literature allow to explore possible linkages between inter-
connectedness and ethics in an organisational setting. 
Even a cursory survey of the literature shows that there are numerous terms 
used to describe the act of unethical behaviour. Greve, Palmer and Pozner write 
about misconduct, defining it as ‘behaviour in or by an organisation that a social-
control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong, where such 
a line can separate legal, ethical and socially responsible behaviour from their an-
tithesis.’2 This is a very broad definition but it introduces a very important observa-
tion concerning the nature of an unethical act. The evaluation of behaviour is subjec-
tive and based upon comparison to the system of norms specific for some communi-
ty like world polity, the state, or professional associations. That is why these authors 
stress the importance of social control agents as institutions representing 
a collectivity that can impose sanctions on that collectivity’s behalf.  
Social control agents’ actions are also supported by media. Although these 
cannot impose legal punitive sanctions, they have the ability to frame behaviour 
and put pressure on social control agents to directly penalize unethical acts. The 
influence of media consists mostly in scrutiny, spreading information about the 
unethical behaviour, and applying more indirect means of punishment, such as 
humiliation.3 
Sullivan, Haunschild and Page use the broad term unethical behaviours and de-
fine it as ‘acts that are illegal under state or federal laws or acts that are unacceptable 
for the larger community.’4 Johnson, Grieve and Fujiwara-Grieve write about corpo-
rate deviance stressing the sphere of societal norms and the process of losing social 
legitimization of organisation’ activities.5 These definitions stress the importance not 
                                                          
1 Some of these unique features of networks of organisations in: K.G. Provan, A. Fish, J. Sydow, 
Interorganizational Networks at the Network Level: A Review of the Empirical Literature on Whole 
Networks, “Journal of Management” 2007, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 481. 
2 H.R. Greve, D. Palmer, J. Pozner, Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences 
of Organizational Misconduct, “The Academy of Management Annals” 2010, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 56.  
3 Ibidem, p. 57. 
4 B.N. Sullivan, P. Haunschild, K. Page, Organizations Non Gratae? The Impact of Unethical Corpo-
rate Acts on Interorganizational Networks, “Organization Science” 2007, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 56.  
5 S. Jonsson, H.R. Greve, T. Fujiwara-Greve, Undeserved Loss: The Spread of Legitimacy Loss to 
Innocent Organizations in Response to Reported Corporate Deviance, “Administrative Science Quar-
terly” 2009, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 195. 
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only of legal aspects but also social norms of a given community. Thus, if we con-
sider cultural differences between various collectivities, it might be a confirmation 
of subjectivity of the perception of whether an organisation breaks the rules or not. 
Research on wrongdoing can include only behaviours that violate a society’s 
laws or, broadly, any behaviour considered deviant from the social norms and 
ethical principles.6 In this article it is conceptualized broadly and including all 
behaviours ranging from unethical to illegal.  
2. Levels of research on unethical behaviours 
Research on organisational unethical behaviour is usually discussed on individual, 
organisational7 or interorganisational level where it concerns networks of organi-
sations. Individual factors often include personal norms, cost-benefit analysis, 
unconscious motivations, intuition, emotion or, recently, moral seduction theory8 
while the organisational ones concern individuals interrelated within the structure 
of a company.9 And among these factors often listed as factors of misconduct are 
strain, culture and networks.10 The first two could also be a subject of research on 
the interorganisational level. 
Strain might be a source of unethical behaviour when individuals are unable 
to achieve goals set for them using legitimate means. When organisations are 
under strain individuals tend to be more prone to unethical behaviour. This is more 
visible in for profit than in non-profit organisations. The main source of the prob-
lem is the level of managerial aspirations in the organisation. That is why strain 
can be present even when the actual situation of a company does not indicate the 
need for it.11 Strain is also prevalent in organisations placing a high value on 
                                                          
6 D. Palmer, C. Moore, Social Networks and Organizational Wrongdoing in Context [in:] Organiza-
tional Wrongdoing, eds. D. Palmer, R. Greenwood, K. Smoth-Crowe, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2016, pp. 153–170. 
7 Research concerning unethical behaviours of organisations is based on an anthropomorphic view of 
organisations in terms of which audiences perceive ‘actions by agents of the organisation as actions by 
the organisation itself’ (J.A.M. Coyle-Shapiro, L.M. Shore, The employee–organization relationship: 
Where do we go from here?, “Human Resource Management Review” 2007, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 169). 
Although this assumption may be seen as controversial, it has been frequently relied on in the related 
social science literature since 1960s.  
8 Literature review on this topic in: A.E. Tenbrunsel, K. Smith‐Crowe, Ethical Decision Making: 
Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, “The Academy of Management Annals” 2008, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 545–607, or B.E. Ashforth, D.A. Gioia, S.L. Robinson, L.K. Treviño, Re-Viewing Organiza-
tional Corruption, “Academy of Management Review” 2008, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 670–684. 
9 Broader characteristics and comparison of these two approaches in: J. Pinto, C.R. Leana, F.K. Pil, 
Corrupt or Organizations of Corrupt Individuals? Two Types of Organization-Level Corruption, 
“Academy of Management Review” 2008, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 685–709. 
10 H.R. Greve, D. Palmer, J. Pozner, op. cit., pp. 64–68. 
11 Research on the influence of differences between performance and aspiration on the likelihood of 
financial misrepresentation in: J. Harris, P. Bromiley, Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive 
Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation, “Organization Science” 2007, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 350–367.  
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achieving extremely high performance. That usually leads to substantial pressure 
on employees by their superiors. Although the research concerning strain on 
a level broader than a single organisation is scarce, it might also be an interesting 
subject of research. The pressure imposed by cooperators, fierce competition or 
regulations of the state difficult to fulfil might provoke organisations to make 
decisions to act outside accepted legal, social or ethical norms. 
Cultural norms and values present in an organisation might also provide sup-
port for unethical behaviours. Culture might facilitate such attitudes by more or 
less explicit endorsement of misconduct in organisational behaviours.12 Cultural 
norms may stress the importance of achieving goals but without guidance on how 
to achieve them. In more explicit ways, organisational culture might be based 
upon the importance of formulating and achieving goals, but without concern 
about the moral character of means.13 The endorsement of misconduct is clearly 
visible when organisational culture is based upon norms accepting and appreciat-
ing actions that are against rules, if they lead to positive outcomes for organisa-
tion.  
Another area of cultural support for unethical behaviours can be seen when an 
organisation implements actions leading to making guilt less serious. There are 
specific techniques of so-called neutralization that are used to justify deviant behav-
iour.14 These include:15 
(1) Denial of responsibility – for example perceiving the unethical behaviour 
as unintentional, a result of some kind of accident or some other negation 
of personal or organisational responsibility.  
(2) Denial of injury – making the wrongfulness of the act subjective, per-
ceiving it rather as not causing any real harm, so that the link between 
the crime and its consequences is absent. 
(3) Denial of the victim – even if an organisation accepts the responsibility 
for the act and acknowledges the hurt, the guilt can be neutralized by 
stressing the importance of circumstances. Usually, that involves argu-
mentation based upon a previous fault of the partner, so the unethical act 
is a form of repayment or revenge and generally speaking the ‘victim’ 
deserved it. That behaviour is especially facilitated if the partner is ab-
stract, not someone that the organisation is directly linked with. 
                                                          
12 N.M. Ashkanasy, C.A. Windsor, L.K. Treviño, Bad Apples in Bad Barrels Revisited: Cognitive 
Moral Development, Just World Beliefs, Rewards, and Ethical Decision-Making, “Business Ethics 
Quarterly” 2006, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 449–473. 
13 B.W. Kulik, Agency Theory, Reasoning and Culture at Enron: In Search of a Solution, “Journal of 
Business Ethics” 2005, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 347–360. 
14 G.M. Sykes, D. Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, “American Socio-
logical Review” 1957, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 667–669. The analysis in the organisational setting in: 
B.E. Ashforth, V. Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, “Research in Organiza-
tional Behavior” 2003, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 1–52. 
15 G.M. Sykes, D. Matza, op. cit., pp. 667–669. For organisational setting compare: B.E. Ashforth, 
V. Anand, op. cit. 
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(4) The condemnation of the condemners – an organisation may try to divert 
the attention from itself stressing the need to understand the motivation 
of partners questioning the ethics of its behaviour. 
(5) The appeal to higher loyalties – arguments used in this technique stress 
that the organisation accused of misconduct was trying to solve the con-
flict between particularistic and universalistic demands and chose to sat-
isfy norms favouring some smaller group of shareholders. 
The cultural influence might also be considered at the macro level, as a cul-
ture of a country or nation may include norms supporting some unethical behav-
iours. Thus, intercultural differences might be a source of varying attitudes to-
wards unethical behaviours among interconnected organisations. 
3. Networks’ influence on unethical behaviour 
Applying network perspective to understanding the behaviour of organisations al-
lows one to take into account mechanisms that are otherwise absent in organisational 
analysis. Most of organisational aspects, like actions and behaviour, can be more 
convincingly explained if we take into account existing ties between organisations.  
One of the important mechanisms concerns the way network facilitates the 
alignment of norms and values. Social network ties can cause the imitation effect 
leading to adaptive responses within interorganisational networks that may reflect 
evidence of a social learning process.16 Haunschild and Miner introduce three 
types of imitation effect: frequency, trait and outcome.17 They concern, respective-
ly, adoption of very common practices, practices of similar organisations, and 
practices with evident impact on others. The imitation effect provides an explana-
tion why a connection to a broader network ensures the adoption of less contro-
versial and more accepted universally practices.18 As some researchers show, it is 
the localized clusters with weaker links to the general network that are more prone 
to adapting controversial (unethical) practices.19  
Another important influence of networks is the secrecy account.20 When organ-
isations decide to take unethical action it is crucial for them to make sure that their 
misbehaviour remains secret. Thus, changes in the structure of a network might 
appear as an intended consequence of the need for secrecy and an attempt to exclude 
others from observing organisation’s actions. The organisation is setting up structur-
al conditions for ensuring that their unethical action remains undetected. 
                                                          
16 E.M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, The Free Press, New York, 1995. 
17 P.R. Haunschild, A.S. Miner, Modes of Interorganizational Imitation: The Effects of Outcome Sali-
ence and Uncertainty, “Administrative Science Quarterly” 1997, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 472–500. 
18 F. Briscoe, S. Safford, The Nixon-In-China Effect: Activism, Imitation, and the Institutionalization of 
Contentious Practices, “Administrative Science Quarterly” 2008, Vol. 53, pp. 460–491. 
19 G.F. Davis, H.R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, “Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology” 1997, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 1–37.  
20 H.R. Greve, D. Palmer, J. Pozner, op. cit., p. 69. 
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Research shows that some characteristics of the organisation and its network 
may also affect the range of sanctions. As Domènec Melé states, the main influ-
ence on the network in respect to the occurrence of unethical behaviour consists in 
providing the instruments of surveillance and effective transmission of reputa-
tion.21 However, some actors in a network can be protected from punitive reac-
tions, because of the position they held in it, owing to their social capital and high 
status.22 Close ties with other individuals and organisations make it possible to 
draw on them in order to avoid or weaken the effects of stigmatization, once the 
information about the unethical behaviour spills out.23 Network contacts can help 
in disseminating the information and contradict stereotypes and attributes in the 
process of reputational sanctioning. 
4. Relational and structural factors  
Traditionally, the occurrence of unethical behaviour was perceived as dependent 
on various factors that could be divided into two main groups. The first group, 
sometimes called the ‘bad apples’ perspective, concentrated on the level of indi-
viduals in organisations and in this area researchers tried to identify their attributes 
forming the moral character of actors. The second group perceived this problem 
from ‘bad barrels’ perspective. The key areas of interest here were the attributes of 
organisations and society that facilitate misconduct. 
However, Brass, Butterfield and Scaggs expanded this perception and con-
structed a model that consists of five main groups of factors.24 The first group con-
sists of factors concerning individuals in organisation (‘bad apples’ perspective) and 
in this area the authors list factors including locus of control, cognitive moral devel-
opment, and Machiavellism. The second group is consistent with the ‘bad barrels’ 
perspective and concentrates on organisational factors such as organisational cli-
mate, reward systems, norms and codes of conduct. The third group pertains to fac-
tors related to the issue of the act itself. In this case actors usually take into account 
magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect and proximity.  
The two remaining groups concentrate on factors related to an organisation’s 
network of ties, and take into account its relational and structural characteristics. 
Types of relationships concern features such as the strength of ties, status, multi-
plexity and asymmetry. The structure of relationships concentrates on the density 
of network, occurrence of cliques and structural holes, the centrality of a network. 
                                                          
21 D. Melé, The Practice of Networking: An Ethical Approach, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2009, 
Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 487–503. 
22 Examples in: P.S. Adler, S. Kwon, Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept, “The Academy of 
Management Review” 2002, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 31, http://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2002.5922314, and 
J. Westphal, P. Khanna, Keeping Directors in Line: Social Distancing as a Control Mechanism in the 
Corporate Elite, “Administrative Science Quarterly” 2003, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 392. 
23 B.M. Wiesenfeld, K.A. Wurthmann, D.C. Hambrick, The Stigmatization and Devaluation of Elites Associated 
with Corporate Failures: A Process Model, “Academy of Management Review” 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 240. 
24 D.J. Brass, K.D. Butterfield, B.C. Skaggs, Relationships and Unethical Behaviour – A Social Net-
work Perspective, “Academy of Management Review” 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 14–31. 
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4.1. Relational factors 
Various scopes of network cohesiveness might lead to differing results. Closely 
tied networks usually lead to conformity, but in large networks they might also 
cause the emergence of local cliques that are very closely tied but also isolated 
from external networks. That makes them more prone to developing distinct 
norms and behaviours that might not be consistent with values generally perceived 
as ethical.25 
The strength of ties can be measured in different ways, but many researchers 
accept Mark Granovetter’s definition of it, as a function of an amount of time spent 
together, the emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services.26 During repeated 
transactions between the same partners, economic relations become supported by 
social content that creates feelings of psychological proximity. Strong ties usually 
develop over time and history of previous transactions between partners. As a result, 
as they begin to trust each other, the need for ensuring safety with legal means of 
both parties decreases. Yet, as Granovetter acknowledges, trust also makes organisa-
tions more vulnerable and may enhance the opportunity of frauds.27 
A multiplex relationship is a situation in which partners are interconnected by 
more than one type of relation.28 For example, economic exchange ties might be 
accompanied by social or family relations. This phenomenon exerts an important 
influence on the probability of unethical behaviour, because it increases the costs 
of misconduct, as it leads to breaking more than one type of relation. 
Asymmetric relations appear when one partner has more power than the oth-
er. This situation might be dangerous for the weaker actor, especially where trust 
is not truly reciprocated.29 Yet, as Gulati and Sytch observe, even asymmetry of 
ties between partners doesn’t necessarily lead to coercion.30 Their research found 
out that stronger partners were reluctant to abuse their relation, because of the 
recurrence of transactions with the same organisation. Their research proved that 
cooperative atmosphere may overweight the potential benefits achieved through 
coercion. 
Another important factor influencing the likelihood of unethical act is status, 
in the sense of the relative power of one actor over another.31 Partners with a low-
er status usually are less willing to break the rules because of the risk of retaliation 
against them. Whilst among partners with a higher status the likelihood of such 
behaviour is highly dependent on organisational factors and norms. 
                                                          
25 H.R. Greve, D. Palmer, J. Pozner, op. cit., p. 69. 
26 M. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, “American Journal of Sociology” 1973, Vol. 78, No. 6, 
pp. 1360–1380.   
27 Idem, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, “American Journal of 
Sociology” 1985, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 491–492. 
28 B. Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 
“Administrative Science Quarterly” 1997, Vol. 42, No. 1, p. 48, http://doi.org/10.2307/2393808. 
29 D.J. Brass, K.D. Butterfield, B C. Skaggs, op. cit., pp. 18–19 
30 R. Gulati, M. Sytch, Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence in Interorganizational Relation-
ships: Effects of Embeddedness on a Manufacturer’s Performance in Procurement Relationships, 
“Administrative Science Quarterly” 2007, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 32–69.  
31 D.J. Brass, K.D. Butterfield, B.C. Skaggs, op. cit., p. 19. 
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4.2. Structural factors 
Structural holes are ‘separations between nonredundant contacts.’32 Actors that 
hold positions in the network allowing them to act as bridges between networks 
not connected in any other way (over structural holes) ‘are considered to be bro-
kers, often occupying positions of considerable influence.’33 An organisation that 
is the only link between two, otherwise non-connected parts of a network, has 
substantial power over partners in these sub-networks. They are dependent on that 
organisation for getting access to unique information and resources. That is why 
the risk of unethical behaviour on their part might be higher, than when they have 
a number of alternative interlinks. 
Centrality is often defined as ‘the extent to which an individual can reach 
others in the fewest number of direct and indirect links.’34 There are two important 
aspects of the influence of centrality of actors’ position on the likelihood of them 
taking unethical actions. Firstly, it might be riskier to do that if an organisation has 
a substantial number of direct connections, as it increases the level of surveillance. 
Having direct contacts with many partners means that there are more agents 
watching organisation’s activities, so the risk of being caught is higher. Further-
more, the network of organisation’s ties consisting of many indirect ties deter-
mines the number of others that might learn about the misconduct and that in-
creases reputational costs of revealing the unethical behaviour. 
The density of ties is another structural factor that influences the risk of un-
ethical behaviours among interconnected organisations. This concept refers to the 
degree to which all individuals of a network are interconnected.35 A significant 
level of weak mutual ties might lead to similar reputational consequences as men-
tioned before. The risk of the diffusion of information about unethical behaviours 
can be a very effective means of discouragement for organisations, because losing 
reputation means tangible economic and market losses and probably will outgrow 
any potential benefits of misconduct. And in a closely-knit network based on trust 
reputation is critical. 
As the number of actors in the network gets significantly larger, communica-
tion becomes difficult and, at times, the network brakes into cliques.36 These can 
be defined as distinct regions ‘in a network of firms in which the interconnections 
among firms are denser than they are in other regions of network.’37 In other 
words, these are groups of strongly tied homogeneous organisations. This internal 
                                                          
32 R.S. Burt, Structural Holes, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1995, p. 18. 
33 K.G. Provan, A. Fish, J. Sydow, Interorganizational Networks at the Network Level: A Review of the 
Empirical Literature on Whole Networks, “Journal of Management” 2007, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 484.  
34 D.J. Brass, K.D. Butterfield, B.C. Skaggs, op. cit., p. 21. 
35 M.T. Seevers, S.J. Skinner, S.W. Kelley, A Social Network Perspective on Sales Force Ethics, 
“Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Force Management” 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 231–251. 
36 Example of applying cliques in the network analysis to study mental health services in: K.G. Provan, 
J.G. Sebastian, Networks Within Networks: Service Link Overlap, Organizational Cliques, and Net-
work Effectiveness, “Academy of Management Journal” 1998, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 453–463. 
37 T.J. Rowley, H.R. Greve, H. Rao, J.A. Baum, A.V. Shipilov, Time to Break Up: Social and Instru-
mental Antecedents of Firm Exits from Exchange Cliques, “The Academy of Management Journal”, 
2005, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 499. 
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homogeneity might lead to forming specific norms contrary to the ones accepted 
universally. The occurrence of such a phenomenon becomes more probable with 
the increase of the size of the network and it becomes more difficult to maintain 
ethical norms across fragmented cliques. 
Conspiracy is a specific case of a group of organisations involved in unethi-
cal activities. It usually forms when the misconduct requires cooperation in order 
to be beneficial for the involved parties. Such grouping requires specific network 
characteristics. In order to avoid the spread of information about an illegitimate 
act, the outside network should consist of sparse, weakly tied actors. However, it 
is essential for the conspiracy to be successful that all the parties involved are 
connected in a network that is centralized, dense and strongly tied. These charac-
teristics enable coordination of their actions and indispensable internal trust.  
5. Diffusion of misconduct through the network 
On the organisation level, the process of spreading of unethical behaviour might 
evolve in time and pass four main phases. The first stage of misconduct, called initia-
tion, is usually concentrated on the individual level and may involve misbehaviour by 
a manager. In the second phase, the unethical behaviour travels down the organisation-
al hierarchy. This proliferation stage usually concerns areas, such as culture, interac-
tion, social learning and techniques of neutralization.38 The third phase involves insti-
tutionalization of misconduct. That means that acting in an unethical way gets embed-
ded in the organisation, as it is supported by specific routines and structures. That 
allows them to be perceived as acceptable. The final stage is socialization. The support 
for unethical behaviour is so deeply engrained in the organisation, that it is imposed on 
new participants. 
The spread of misconduct among organisations may arise as a result of the imita-
tion effect, as an increasing number of interconnected organisations start adapting and 
implementing the same behaviour. Sometimes the unethical behaviour appears in local 
parts of a network where local elites try to form their own norms of behaviour, contra-
ry to broadly accepted norms of the field.39 However acting against some norms may 
also arise when organisations are uncertain about the exact interpretation of the norm. 
Some authors explain the spread of unethical behaviours using the mecha-
nism of social contagion.40 This phenomenon may arise under favourable circum-
stances that include close relations between organisations and social control agents 
responsible for ensuring the ethics of organisations’ actions.41 Some promulgated 
                                                          
38 B.E. Ashford, V. Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, “Research in Organiza-
tional Behavior” 2003, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 4–34.  
39 G.F. Davis, H.R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, “Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology” 1997, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 1–37.  
40 H.R. Greve, D. Palmer, J. Pozner, op. cit., pp. 79–81. 
41 Examples of the spread of misconduct as a result of unethical actions of professional auditors in: 
D.A. Moore, P.E. Tetlock, L. Tanlu, M.H. Bazerman, Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor 
Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, “Academy of Management Review” 
2006, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 10–29. 
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rules of conduct might as well provide opportunities for misconduct. Social con-
trol agents might also inadvertently set regulations that motivate organisations to 
behaviours conducive to reducing the risk of being detected, like shredding docu-
ments.42 Sometimes intrusive checking activities of social control agents might 
push an organisation to deviance. The legal system might also facilitate creating 
associations that become an important source of resources necessary for avoiding 
detection. Their emergence leads also to some group effects like mutual support 
and group pressure for misconduct.43 
The spread of unethical behaviour depends also on the level of cohesiveness 
of the network. Strong ties require a certain level of proximity that might lead to 
the similarity of attitudes, norms and behaviours. According to the ‘homophily’ 
concept, the similarity between actors breeds attraction and the more time they 
spend together the more similar they become.44 That may also entail a similarity in 
attitudes towards unethical behaviour. 
6. Consequences of unethical behaviour 
The consequences of unethical behaviour are often set in the legal system as crim-
inal and civil sanctions, but there are also some effects that are of an extra-judicial 
nature. Usually, the shareholders of an organisation, including owners, interactive 
partners or customers, can assume punitive reactions to such situations. Partners 
might impose additional costs to ensure the safety of future transaction, to ascer-
tain that the organisation does not repeat its illegitimate actions.45 As a rule, mar-
ket-based sanctions, such as decreasing reputation, should be higher for organisa-
tions with a higher status, but, as some research shows, small firms are sometimes 
punished more harshly.46 One of the explanations of this phenomenon is the lack 
of alternatives for carrying transactions with other, alternative partners.47 
When an organisation acts in an unethical way its network of ties is prone to 
changes.48 Its partners and customers leave and this process involves, in particular, 
those with a high status. The reason behind it is that firms with a higher status are 
                                                          
42 On the example of Enron in: B.E. Ashford, V. Anand, op. cit., p. 2. 
43 J.D. Collins, K. Uhlenbruck, P. Rodriguez, Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management 
Perspective, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2009, Vol. 87, No. 1, p. 102. 
44 M. McPherson, L. Smith-Lovin, J.M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 
“Annual Review of Sociology” 2001, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 415–444. 
45 S. Jonsson, H.R. Greve, T. Fujiwara-Greve, Undeserved Loss: The Spread of Legitimacy Loss to 
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more at risk of losing their reputation. As research shows, reputation is a double-
edged sword. It can be an important source of competitive advantage, but when 
firms misbehave or are perceived as connected with the ones that do so, firms of 
good reputation suffer more market sanctions than those with low reputation.49 
At the exposure of unethical behaviour, partners linked to the organisation face 
the decision whether to remain connected with it and risk, as Erving Goffman called 
it, ‘courtesy stigma’ or cut the links with the wrongdoer.50 Usually, organisations try 
to avoid association with those labelled negatively, as it may be perceived as 
a liability and lead to isolation. As they start to defect the network, the effect of 
imitation again comes into being. More and more organisations start cutting the ties, 
as a result of response-based imitation (because others are doing it and it is per-
ceived as the right thing to do) or consequence-based defection (on the basis of the 
assumption that in this situation the survival of the partner is endangered).51  
Another effect of unethical behaviour is a delegitimization.52 Legitimization 
of organisations’ activities is perceived and evaluated by various audiences. Most 
of them try to simplify their perception by using categorization, that is trying to 
group organisations with specific characteristics. Unethical behaviour can cause 
loss of legitimization also for other, quite innocent organisations that are generally 
perceived as similar.53 This mechanism might be reinforced by media releases that 
are provoking a reaction by the audiences even though they are not really facing 
any direct consequences of the wrongdoing. 
As a consequence, delegitimated organisation’s partners may try to avoid ef-
fects of being associated with it. That is true especially for large, successful and 
firms with a good reputation. Information about a partner’s misconduct may moti-
vate them to make a decision to sever links with partners with low legitimization. 
As the information about illegitimacy travels in the network, high-quality partners 
are not willing to be linked with such an organisation. That is why, for building its 
network, it may be forced to look for more distant partners. That, in turn, changes 
the cohesiveness of the network, cutting previous close ties which allow access to 
reliable information and help to enforce mutually accepted norms. 
Avoidance of being linked to the wrongdoer by previous partners is one of 
the consequences concerning the changes in interorganisational networks after the 
uncovering of misconduct.54 It is often justified by fear of risk that a partner might 
become a future victim. As stated before such connection may also mean reduced 
legitimacy for the linked organisations. According to Suchman, ‘because legitimi-
                                                          
49 M. Rhee, P.R. Haunschild, The Liability of Good Reputation: A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. 
Automobile Industry, “Organization Science” 2006, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 113. 
50 E. Goffman, Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1963, pp. 30–31. 
51 M. Jensen, Should We Stay or Should We Go? Status Accountability Anxiety and Client Defections, 
“Administrative Science Quarterly” 2006, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 105.  
52 B.N. Sullivan, P. Haunschild, K. Page, op. cit., pp. 55–70.  
53 S. Jonsson, H.R. Greve, T. Fujiwara-Greve, Undeserved Loss: The Spread of Legitimacy Loss to 
Innocent Organizations in Response to Reported Corporate Deviance, “Administrative Science Quar-
terly” 2009, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 221. 
54 Ibidem, pp. 197–198.  
34 KALINA GRZESIUK 
zation is frequently mutualistic the risk of negative contagion may drive long-
standing allies to dissociate themselves from a troubled counterpart.’55 Sometimes 
partners decide to sever the ties just because they do not tolerate unethical behav-
iour by partners.56 
7. Summary 
The effect of being interconnected with other organisations on the occurrence and 
spread of unethical behaviour became a popular area of scientific interest at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Previous network analyses of misconduct tradition-
ally concentrated on the level of social ties between individuals within an organi-
sation. Contemporary research concerning this subject is heading toward compre-
hensive analysis of so-called ‘whole’ networks, meaning networks of intercon-
nected organisations. 
This area of research is relatively new and there are many directions that re-
quire further analysis in the future. Some of them, like strain and culture on the 
macro level, have already been mentioned in the text above. However, the review 
of the literature on this subject revealed some other areas as well. 
Most of the research available today is based upon a static analysis of net-
works in a given time. Introducing a dynamic approach, including changes of the 
networks over time, might explain why some of the network analyses provide 
inconsistent results. Longitudinal studies may also reveal some mechanisms that 
cannot be seen on the basis of static analysis or over short periods of time.  
Another area that, in my opinion, requires further analysis is the influence of 
such factors, as: types of network, network position, structural holes and cliques, 
on the occurrence of unethical behaviour. Although there are some studies by 
various authors, they often either regard the level of a single organisation, or de-
liver inconsistent or contradictory results.  
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